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Law, Power, and “Rumors of War”:
Robert Jackson Confronts Law and Security
After Nuremberg
MARY L. DUDZIAK†
INTRODUCTION
When Robert Jackson traveled to Buffalo in October
1946, he stood on the threshold of a new era. In his
centennial speech, Jackson took account of a war era the
world was just emerging from. The horrors of World War II,
he hoped, reshaped the world in a way that would lessen
such devastating conflict and destruction. Until this time,
collective efforts had not been able to hold back war. But
Nuremberg changed this, he hoped. Its long-range
significance lay in “the effort to demonstrate or to establish
the supremacy of law over such lawless and catastrophic
forces as war and persecutions.”1 From Nuremberg might
come “legal controls of these disastrous forces.”2 But only
the coming years would show whether the efforts at
Nuremberg were “but a flash of light in an otherwise dark
century, or . . . the harbinger of a dawn.”3
Even as Jackson urged that human action, through law,
could hold back the forces of warfare, he warned of a
different future. “If the East and the West cannot or will not
† Judge Edward J. and Ruey L. Professor of Law, History and Political Science,
University of Southern California Gould School of Law. Many thanks to Alfred
Konefsky, Dianne Avery, Mateo Taussig-Rubbo, and others on the SUNY
Buffalo Law School faculty for their helpful comments on this Essay and on my
broader work on wartime. Thanks to Julia Wood, Habeeb Syed, and Sam Petty
for their essential help with research, to Marguerite Most of the Duke Law
Library, and to the Buffalo Law Review staff.
1. Robert H. Jackson, Address at the University of Buffalo Centennial
Convocation, October 4, 1946, 60 BUFF. L. REV. 283, 287 (2012).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 293.
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bridge the gaps in interest and method and political
viewpoint now evident and so often overdramatized, it may
be that the good effects of this drawing together in
jurisprudential principles and procedures will be
dissipated.”4 But they had worked so hard to overcome
national differences at Nuremberg. He simply found it
“difficult to believe that we will not be able to live together
without sacrificing either the peace or fundamental
interests.”5
My task in this Essay is to set Jackson in the world he
occupied when he returned from Nuremberg, and to follow
him as that world fell apart. In Nuremberg, Jackson and his
colleagues took what war had wrought, and they fashioned
legal tools that they hoped would lessen war itself. In this
effort, Jackson changed law that applied to warfare. In
looking to the future, he seems to have assumed that
although law had changed, war would retain its essential
character. Yet as the post-war years became instead the
Cold War years, Jackson found himself in an era when the
boundaries around wartime were eroding.6 The world
entered an ambiguous era that seemed to be neither war
nor peace. During such an era, how did Jackson think about
war? What sort of war era did he think the nation was
facing, and how should it affect rights and government
power at home?
A set of ideas about war and peace were held by the
World War II generation. Wartime and peacetime were
thought to be, more or less, distinct states. People could tell
when they were in a wartime—after all, Congress would
declare it. Wartime was always followed by peacetime, and
this meant that wars were, by definition, temporary. Rights
were sometimes compromised in wartimes, and presidents
overstepped the limits to their power, but since wartimes
were temporary, that would eventually go away.7
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. See MARY L. DUDZIAK,
CONSEQUENCES 61-94 (2012).
7. See id. at 11-32.
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This basic structure to thinking about wartime still
lurks in American jurisprudence, even in the age of drone
warfare.8 But there was a moment when this way of
thinking seemed to collapse, when the concept of peacetime
dissolved. As Jackson himself would put it when he
returned to Buffalo to deliver the inaugural James
McCormick Mitchell Lecture in 1951, rather than a break
between wartime and peacetime, there was instead “a
prolonged period of international tension and rumors of
war, with war itself as the ever threatening alternative.”9
Could Jackson‟s vision of peace through law and legal
institutions hold during a Cold War?
I. POSTWAR BECOMES COLD WAR
Before the Nuremberg tribunal heard its first witness,
writers on both sides of the Atlantic took stock of a world
reshaped by the advent of nuclear weapons. In the fall of
1945, George Orwell wrote that the bomb was likely to
change the structure of global politics. Weak states would
become weaker, and “two or three monstrous super-states,”
each with nuclear weapons, would “divid[e] the world
between them.”10 These monster states would not use the
bomb against each other. Instead, each state might be
“unconquerable and in a permanent state of „cold war‟ with
its neighbours.”11 The nuclear age would be, therefore, a
“cold war” era, in which the world would see “an end to
large-scale wars at the cost of prolonging indefinitely „a
peace that is no peace‟.”12

8. See id. at 95-132.
9. Robert H. Jackson, Wartime Security and Liberty Under Law, 1 BUFF. L.
REV. 103, 104 (1951).
10. George Orwell, You and the Atomic Bomb, TRIBUNE (London), Oct. 19,
1945, reprinted in 4 THE COLLECTED ESSAYS, JOURNALISM AND LETTERS OF
GEORGE ORWELL: IN FRONT OF YOUR NOSE, 1946-1950, at 6, 8 (Sonia Orwell &
Ian Angus eds., 1968).
11. Id. at 9.
12. Id. at 10.
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The idea of a “cold war” was, of course, intentionally
contradictory, suggesting an era of war-but-not-war.13 But
international tensions soon escalated. In March 1946, while
the Nuremberg trial was in session, Winston Churchill
warned that “an iron curtain has descended across the
Continent” of Europe.14 This was “a solemn moment” as the
United States, “at the pinnacle of world power,” shouldered
“an awe-inspiring accountability to the future.”15 For
Churchill, Soviet power and aggression would not be reined
in by international law. They could only be met with
American strength and solidarity with Western Europe.16
The anxieties of the nuclear age were manifested in
post-World War II national security politics. Historian
Michael Hogan argues that Cold War struggles over
American policy and the nature of the state were about
more than combating communism. Also at stake was
American national identity, the nation‟s role in the world,
and the impact of Cold War policies on domestic
institutions.17
After World War II, Americans hoped for a return to
peacetime concerns. Initially, American leaders were
divided in their perceptions of the world conditions that the
nation confronted. In battles over the budget and military
policy, some policymakers viewed the idea of distinctions
between war and peace to be a “technicality” outmoded in a
new era “when the United States had to be prepared for war

13. The term was popularized by Walter Lippman and Bernard Baruch, and
entered American political discourse in 1947. See Bernard Baruch, Text of
Bernard Baruch’s Address at Portrait Unveiling, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1947, at
21; Walter Lippmann, Today and Tomorrow, The Cold War: Study of U.S.
Policy, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1947, at 11; WALTER LIPPMANN, THE COLD WAR: A
STUDY IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY (1947).
14. Winston S. Churchill, The Sinews of Peace, Address at Westminster
College in Fulton, Missouri (Mar. 5, 1946), in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS
COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897-1963, at 7285, 7290 (Robert Rhodes James ed., 1974).
15. Id. at 7286.
16. Id. at 7285-93.
17. MICHAEL J. HOGAN, A CROSS OF IRON: HARRY S. TRUMAN AND THE ORIGINS
SECURITY STATE, 1945-1954, at 24 (1998).
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on a permanent basis.”18 “The central challenge of statemaking in the early Cold War,” Hogan argues, “was to
prepare for permanent struggle without surrendering
constitutional principles and democratic traditions to the
garrison state.”19
President Harry S. Truman initially tried to maintain
the idea of a peacetime world, insisting that his policies
were
not
“mobilization
for
war,”
but
instead
“preparedness.”20 But Truman himself encouraged war
hysteria to generate support for foreign aid in his “Truman
Doctrine” speech in March 1947.21 Framing the Cold War as
an epic struggle, Truman warned that “[a]t the present
moment in world history nearly every nation must choose
between alternative ways of life. The choice is too often not
a free one.”22 Truman contrasted a “way of life [ ] . . . based
upon the will of the majority, and . . . distinguished by free
institutions, . . . freedom of speech and religion, and
freedom from political oppression,” and a “second way of
life” that “relies upon terror and oppression, a controlled
press and radio, fixed elections, and the suppression of
personal freedoms.”23
To safeguard American liberty and freedom, Truman
insisted that the United States must support free peoples
who were resisting communism around the world, so the
Truman Doctrine was about the projection of American
power, not about maintaining peace through international
institutions.24 The following year would seem darker, with a
coup in Czechoslovakia, the ouster of non-communist
members of its government, and the Soviet blockade of West
18. Id. at 215.
19. Id. at 234.
20. Id. at 217.
21. Id. at 15.
22. President Harry S. Truman, Special Message to the Congress on Greece
and Turkey, Address Before a Joint Session of Congress, 1947 PUB. PAPERS 176,
178 (Mar. 12, 1947).
23. Id.
24. See id. at 179-80; CAMPBELL CRAIG & FREDRIK LOGEVALL, AMERICA‟S COLD
WAR: THE POLITICS OF INSECURITY 76-82 (2009).
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Berlin, geared toward driving American, French, and
British troops from the city.25 Then, in August 1949, the
Soviet Union exploded its first atomic bomb. In October of
that year, China “fell” to the Communists, as Mao Zedong‟s
troops prevailed in a civil war.26 In June 1950, North Korean
forces, allied with the Soviets and China, invaded South
Korea with the goal of reunifying the divided country.
Within days, President Truman committed American forces
to a United Nations action in support of South Korea.27 As
events seemed to propel the world closer to the brink,
American leaders crafted a Cold War strategy premised on
the idea that projecting American military power around
the world was the best means of safeguarding American
security. NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs
for National Security would remain secret during Jackson‟s
lifetime, but it became central to American national security
policy.28 Its vision was that the only protection against an
aggressive Soviet Union was to project American power and
extend American military engagement. If international law
might restrain aggression, it was at least a distant second to
power—economic and military.
At home, Cold War anxieties filtered into domestic
politics. In February 1950, Senator Joseph McCarthy falsely
claimed that he had a list of 205 communists employed in
the State Department. McCarthy had been looking for a
campaign issue.29 He would not be alone in “red-baiting,” as
politicians quickly learned that campaigning against
communism was an effective way to run for office. 30
25. CRAIG & LOGEVALL, supra note 24, at 91-95.
26. Id. at 102.
27. Id. at 114-18.
28. NAT‟L SECURITY COUNCIL, NSC-68: A REPORT TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL BY THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ON UNITED STATES OBJECTIVES AND
PROGRAMS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY (Apr. 14, 1950), reprinted in U.S. DEP‟T OF
STATE, FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1950 NATIONAL SECURITY
AFFAIRS, FOREIGN AND ECONOMIC POLICY 234, 234-92 (1974); see also CRAIG &
LOGEVALL, supra note 24, at 127-38.
29. ELLEN SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE CRIMES: MCCARTHYISM
(1998); CRAIG & LOGEVALL, supra note 24, at 123-24.

IN

AMERICA 241

30. See STEPHEN M. FELDMAN, FREE EXPRESSION AND DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA:
A HISTORY 431-33 (2008).
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Meanwhile, Hogan writes, national security “became the
common currency of most policy makers, the arbiter of most
values, the key to America‟s new identity.”31 In American
national security ideology, “the distinction between war and
peace had disappeared,” as the government transitioned
into a National Security state.32
II. JUSTICE JACKSON‟S COLD WAR
A. The Communist Threat
These global tensions troubled Robert Jackson as he
resumed his role as a Supreme Court Justice, and they
challenged his vision of peace through law. In the spring of
1947, the specter of imminent war did not worry him, but
instead the spread of totalitarianism, which left the world
“more fear-ridden” than it was “at the close of a war to give
freedom from fear.”33 In World War II-related cases, he had
counseled against wholesale abrogation of rights because of
security concerns. In Cramer v. United States, which
overturned, on the basis of insufficient evidence, a
conviction for treason of a man charged with helping two
German saboteurs, Jackson quoted Thomas Paine: “He that
would make his own liberty secure must guard even his
enemy from oppression.”34 Jackson dissented in Korematsu
v. United States, arguing that the Court should not ratify
the internment of Japanese Americans during the war.35
One of Jackson‟s most celebrated Supreme Court
opinions on individual rights and war was West Virginia
Board of Education v. Barnette in 1943.36 The Court held
31. HOGAN, supra note 17, at 313.
32. Id. at 209, 300, 313.
33. Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.,
Address at the United Jewish Appeal (Apr. 15, 1947), available at
http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/speeches/speeches-byrobert-h-jackson/address-at-the-united-jewish-appeal/.
34. 325 U.S. 1, 48 (1945) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Eugene
C. Gerhart, A Decade of Mr. Justice Jackson, 28 N.Y.U. L. REV. 927, 948 (1958).
35. 323 U.S. 214, 248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting).
36. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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that a mandatory flag salute requirement violated the
rights of Jehovah‟s Witness children who were expelled
from school when, for religious reasons, they refused to
salute the flag.37 Barnette reversed a 1940 ruling in which
Justice Felix Frankfurter had argued that “national unity is
the basis of national security,” and it was constitutional to
require the flag salute as a means of fostering that unity.38
Jackson in Barnette saw it differently. “Struggles to coerce
uniformity of sentiment in support of some end thought
essential to their time and country have been waged by
many good as well as by evil men,” he wrote for the Court. 39
But:
Ultimate futility of such attempts to compel coherence is the
lesson of every such effort from the Roman drive to stamp out
Christianity as a disturber of its pagan unity, the Inquisition, as a
means to religious and dynastic unity, the Siberian exiles as a
means to Russian unity, down to the fast failing efforts of our
present totalitarian enemies. Those who begin coercive
elimination of dissent soon find themselves exterminating
dissenters. Compulsory unification of opinion achieves only the
40
unanimity of the graveyard.

Cold War-era cases would show that Jackson‟s tolerance
of dissenting speech was limited, however. In 1949, he
dissented in a landmark free speech case, Terminiello v.
Chicago, arguing that dangerous speech should be
controlled, for “if the Court [did] not temper its doctrinaire
logic with a little practical wisdom, it will convert the
constitutional Bill of Rights into a suicide pact.”41 He was
especially unsympathetic to the Communist Party, viewing
37. Id. at 642.
38. Minersville Sch. Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 595, 599-600 (1940).
39. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 640.
40. Id. at 641.
41. 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting). In Terminiello, the Court
struck down the conviction of a priest whose vitriolic speech, which incited a
crowd, led to his arrest for breach of the peace. Justice William O. Douglas
wrote for the majority that “a function of free speech under our system is to
invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a
condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even
stirs people to anger.” Id. at 4 (majority opinion).
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it as a “conspiratorial and revolutionary junta, organized to
reach ends and to use methods which are incompatible with
our constitutional system.”42
Jackson sided with the majority in the prosecution of
Communist Party members in Dennis v. United States;
however, in his concurrence, Jackson did not apply the
Court‟s prevailing First Amendment doctrine.43 Instead, he
argued that the defendants were not entitled to it. Jackson
devoted much of his concurrence to a description of the
methods of communists, drawing lessons from recent
experience, including the 1948 coup in Czechoslovakia,
where, he wrote, “the Communist Party during its
preparatory stage claimed and received protection for its
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly.”44 The
international Communist movement, Jackson argued, was
“able only to harass our own country. But it has seized
control of a dozen other countries.”45
The Court majority held that the prosecution was
lawful, purporting to apply the “clear and present danger”
test under the First Amendment.46 For Jackson, however,
the “clear and present danger” test had been developed for a
different era:
When the issue is criminality of a hot-headed speech on a street
corner, or circulation of a few incendiary pamphlets, or parading
by some zealots behind a red flag, or refusal of a handful of school
children to salute our flag, it is not beyond the capacity of the
judicial process to gather, comprehend, and weigh the necessary
materials for decision whether it is a clear and present danger of
47
substantive evil or a harmless letting off of steam.

But the doctrine should not apply to communists, “a
well-organized, nation-wide conspiracy,” he wrote, “[u]nless
we are to hold our Government captive in a judge-made
42. Am. Commc'ns Ass'n v. Douds, 339 US 382, 424 (1950); Gerhart, supra
note 34, at 966.
43. 341 U.S. 494, 567-70 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring).
44. Id. at 566.
45. Id. at 563.
46. See id. at 515 (majority opinion).
47. Id. at 568 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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verbal trap.”48 In rejecting the claims of the Dennis
defendants, Jackson placed most of his attention not on the
facts in evidence, but on what he knew and believed about
communism in the world. “The Communist Party
realistically is a state within a state, an authoritarian
dictatorship within a republic,” he wrote.49 “It demands
these freedoms not for its members, but for the organized
party. It denies to its own members at the same time the
freedom to dissent, to debate, to deviate from the party line,
and enforces its authoritarian rule by crude purges, if
nothing more violent.”50 In contrast to Jackson‟s concerns
about dangers posed by communism, Justice Douglas
argued in dissent that the Communist Party had no power
in the United States because their ideas had been rejected.51
Protecting rights safeguarded democracy, Jackson had
argued in the flag salute case, but in Dennis, rights seemed
to threaten free government. In arguing that the security
threat counseled departure from the Court‟s otherwise
applicable doctrine, Jackson‟s argument was triggered by
his assessment of the nature of the threat—a national
security judgment courts are usually reluctant to engage in.
The idea that communists were a singular threat, and
so were outside the law, mattered in other cases, including
American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, which upheld
the requirement that labor leaders file an affidavit that they
were not communists before a union could benefit from the
protection of federal labor law.52 Jackson spent much of his
lengthy concurrence and dissent discussing the nature of
the Communist Party, to support his argument that
“Congress reasonably could have concluded that the
Communist Party is something different in fact from any
other substantial party we have known, and hence may
constitutionally be treated as something different in law.”53
48. Id.
49. Id. at 577.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 584-85 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
52. 339 U.S. 382, 414-16 (1950).
53. Id. at 423 (Jackson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (footnote
omitted).
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Again, existing principles should not be applied to this
dangerous group. Jackson‟s analysis of communism was so
resonant that it was reprinted in Harper’s Magazine.54
Jackson‟s views about communism would carry through
to cases outside of criminal prosecution and labor law,
including a case in which important human rights were at
stake. In Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, Jackson wrote the
majority opinion upholding the deportation of three resident
aliens who arrived in the United States as children, and
later joined the Communist Party.55 The power to deport
was greatest in war, Jackson wrote, but the deportation
power was also important during an ambiguous era, like the
Cold War, since “Congressional apprehension of foreign or
internal dangers short of war may lead to its use.”56 The
Cold War, for Jackson, was “short of war,” but examples
related to military conflict informed the opinion. “[T]he Due
Process Clause does not shield the citizen from conscription
and the consequent calamity of being separated from family,
friends, home and business while he is transported to
foreign lands to stem the tide of Communism,” Jackson
wrote, presumably alluding to the reinstatement of the
draft in 1948.57 “If Communist aggression creates such
hardships for loyal citizens, it is hard to find justification for
holding that the Constitution requires that its hardships
must be spared the Communist alien.”58 It seemed that this
quasi-war had made communists a quasi-enemy.
Jackson‟s vision of human rights had been crafted in an
era when many European Jews became stateless in their
flight from the Holocaust, so he was attuned to the great
human impact of the deportation power.59 Still, “[w]e think
54. Robert H. Jackson, The Communists in America, HARPER‟S MAG., Sept.
1950, at 21, available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/files/thecenter/files/
bibliography/1950s/the-communists-in-america.pdf.
55. 342 U.S. 580, 581, 596 (1952).
56. Id. at 587.
57. Id. at 591; see HOGAN, supra note 17, at 154-56.
58. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591.
59. See EUGENE C. GERHART, ROBERT H. JACKSON: COUNTRY LAWYER, SUPREME
COURT JUSTICE, AMERICA'S ADVOCATE 307-406 (2003).
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that, in the present state of the world, it would be rash and
irresponsible to reinterpret our fundamental law to deny or
qualify the Government‟s power of deportation,” he wrote.60
“However desirable world-wide amelioration of the lot of
aliens, we think it is peculiarly a subject for international
diplomacy.”61 Reform in this area must come from the
President and Congress, not from the courts.
For Jackson, rights in these cases did not turn on
whether the nation was in wartime or peacetime, but on the
nature of the threat. He argued that the political branches
were better at judging the proper response to difficult
national security problems, but he nevertheless rested his
opinions on his own national security analysis, rather than
simple deference.
There were limits to Jackson‟s willingness to uphold
actions against noncitizens thought to be security risks,
however. In Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, the
Court upheld the exclusion of a resident alien who had gone
overseas to visit his ailing mother.62 When he tried to
return, he was barred from entering the United States on
security grounds.63 Because no other country would admit
him, Mezei was held indefinitely at Ellis Island.64 The
government refused to reveal the evidence supporting
Mezei‟s exclusion because its disclosure “would be
prejudicial to the public interest.”65
Jackson was outraged. Because Mezei had no right to
enter the United States, did it follow that “he has no rights
at all?” Jackson asked.66 The government argued that Mezei
was free to leave at any time, and that Ellis Island was
60. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 591.
61. Id.
62. 345 U.S. 206, 207-08, 216 (1953). See generally Charles D. Weisselberg,
The Exclusion and Detention of Aliens: Lessons from the Lives of Ellen Knauff
and Ignatz Mezei, 143 U. PA. L. REV. 933 (1995).
63. Mezei, 345 U.S. at 208.
64. Id. at 209.
65. Id. at 208.
66. Id. at 226 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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simply his “refuge.”67 “That might mean freedom,” Jackson
wrote, “if only he were an amphibian! Realistically, this
man is incarcerated by a combination of forces which keep
him as effectually as a prison.”68
Jackson was also sympathetic in the 1950 case of Ellen
Knauff, a “war bride” who was excluded from the United
States without a hearing for national security reasons, an
outcome Jackson found to be “brutal.”69 He wrote in dissent
that “[t]he plea that evidence of guilt must be secret is
abhorrent to free men, because it provides a cloak for the
malevolent, the misinformed, the meddlesome, and the
corrupt to play the role of informer undetected and
uncorrected.”70 Knauff faced separation from her husband,
but Harisiades had also involved the separation of
families.71 It seems difficult to avoid the conclusion that the
weight given by Jackson to the government‟s national
security claims turned at least in part on his sympathies for
the parties.
B. Presidential War Power
If the communist cases show Jackson‟s thinking about
national security, cases about war powers tell us more about
how he thought about war and external threats themselves.
Jackson concurred in Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., a case
that upheld a rent-control law based on Congress‟s war
powers, even though it was passed in 1947.72 Jackson agreed
with the outcome, but he felt the need to “utter more
explicit misgivings about war powers than the Court has
done” because of the government‟s arguments in the case.73
The Justice Department had offered no basis for the
67. Id. at 220.
68. Id.
69. United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 550 (1950)
(Jackson, J., dissenting).
70. Id. at 550.
71. Harisiades, 342 U.S. at 581.
72. 333 U.S. 138, 144-46 (1948).
73. Id. at 146 (Jackson, J., concurring).
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statute‟s constitutionality other than the “vague, undefined
and undefinable „war power.‟”74 He wrote:
[T]his power is the most dangerous one to free government in the
whole catalogue of powers. It usually is invoked in haste and
excitement when calm legislative consideration of constitutional
limitation is difficult. It is executed in a time of patriotic fervor
that makes moderation unpopular. And, worst of all, it is
interpreted by judges under the influence of the same passions
and pressures. Always, as in this case, the Government urges
hasty decision to forestall some emergency or serve some purpose,
and pleads that paralysis will result if its claims to power are
75
denied or their confirmation delayed.

If the war power could be invoked simply because the
effects of the war lingered, then the war power would be
“permanent—as permanent as the war debts.”76 The reason
Jackson thought the war power applied to a 1947 law was
not because of the continuing effects of a war that had
ended, but instead due to the continuance of war itself. “We
have armies abroad exercising our war power and have
made no peace terms with our allies, not to mention our
principal enemies.”77 In fact, the formal ending of hostilities
with Germany and Japan would not come until 1951 and
1952, respectively.78
Jackson‟s tremendously influential concurrence in the
Steel Seizure case is his most well-remembered analysis of
presidential power.79 This 1952 case, in which the Court
struck down President Truman‟s effort to seize steel mills to
avert a strike, is remembered by constitutional scholars as a
case about presidential power during wartime.80 The
ambiguities of the Cold War era might, at first glance, be
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 147.
77. Id.
78. See DUDZIAK, supra note 6, at 37-38. On the endings to World War II,
which extended over many years, see id. at 33-40.
79. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
646 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
80. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 101-02 (1995).
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brushed aside, since the case dealt squarely with President
Truman‟s power during the Korean War, when American
troops were in active combat, and steel was necessary for
the production of war materiel.81
Jackson‟s concurrence famously categorizes the scope of
presidential power based on whether or not the president is
acting pursuant to, or against, authorization from
Congress.82 But Jackson goes beyond this topic in this
important case. He does not set the case in the context of a
“wartime,” but instead, remarks on the slipperiness of the
category, so that presidential war power did not appear to
have a firm foundation. “Loose and irresponsible use of
adjectives colors all non-legal and much legal discussion of
presidential powers,” he wrote.83 “„Inherent‟ powers,
„implied‟ powers, „incidental‟ powers, „plenary‟ powers, „war‟
powers and „emergency‟ powers are used, often
interchangeably and without fixed or ascertainable
meanings.”84
Jackson warned that a president cannot have the power
to define an era as a war, thereby triggering his own war
powers.85 He did not find it “necessary or appropriate” to
determine the legal status of “the Korean enterprise.”86
Congress retained the power to declare war—and they had
not used it. In Korea, the President had acted without
Congress, thereby seeming to “invest[ ] himself with „war
powers.‟”87
[N]o doctrine that the Court could promulgate would seem to me
more sinister and alarming than that a President whose conduct
of foreign affairs is so largely uncontrolled, and often even is
unknown, can vastly enlarge his mastery over the internal affairs

81. See MAEVE MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 1-2, 75-76 (1977).
82. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 635-39 (Jackson, J., concurring).
83. Id. at 646.
84. Id. at 647.
85. See id. at 642.
86. Id. at 643.
87. Id. at 642.
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of the country by his own commitment of the Nation‟s armed forces
88
to some foreign venture.

Jackson himself had argued that President Roosevelt
could draw upon the Commander-in-Chief power long before
Congress declared war during World War II.89 He thought
that the Court should not limit this power. It deserved “the
widest latitude of interpretation . . . at least when turned
against the outside world for the security of our society.”90 It
was the internal use of these powers in a labor dispute that
troubled Jackson. We did not have a “militaristic system” of
government, but a “constitutional Republic.”91 The purpose
of placing the presidency and the commander-in-chief in one
person “was to insure that the civilian would control the
military, not to enable the military to subordinate the
presidential office. No penance would ever expiate the sin
against free government of holding that a President can
escape control of executive powers by law through assuming
his military role.”92 The reliance on emergency power by
European governments during World War II showed that
“emergency powers are consistent with free government
only when their control is lodged elsewhere than in the
Executive who exercises them.”93
If Jackson‟s anti-communist opinions seem tied within
the fears of his era, it is the Steel Seizure concurrence that
helps us to look forward. His most important critique was
that the President had himself declared an era a wartime,
and then argued that this self-declared wartime was the
occasion for the expansion of his own powers. Jackson called
Korea a “foreign venture,” not a de jure war, but perhaps a
de facto war.94 When it came to the powers of war, he argued
that in our system of government they must be reined in by
88. Id. (emphasis added).
89. See ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER‟S PORTRAIT
D. ROOSEVELT 80-83 (John Q. Barrett ed., 2003).
90. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 645 (emphasis added).
91. Id.
92. Id. at 646.
93. Id. at 652.
94. Id. at 642.
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law, and not invoked by the president on his own and
without political restraints.
Jackson‟s concern in the Steel Seizure case, that a
president should not go to war without Congress, thereby
generating his own war powers, would become more
important in later years. War would not be formally
declared again for the rest of the twentieth century, and yet
war powers would be drawn upon repeatedly in more
occasions like Korea.95
And so Jackson‟s most important point in the Steel
Seizure case is not the analysis for which his opinion is
usually cited. The President had himself declared an era a
wartime, Jackson argued, and then this self-declared
wartime was used as the occasion for the expansion of his
own powers.96 As we can see from the Steel Seizure case, this
problem existed long before a President would declare war
on terrorism. Later Presidents would also announce a
wartime and commit American troops, and thereby would
create the occasion for the invocation of their own war
powers.97
III. RUMORS OF WAR
When Robert Jackson returned to Buffalo to deliver the
first Mitchell Lecture on May 9, 1951, he spoke of an altered
world.98 This time his topic was “Wartime Security and
Liberty Under Law,” but his title belied the ambiguity of the
era.99 His lecture drew from his opinions of the previous few
years, when he so often described the era in more fluid
terms.100
95. See, e.g., FISHER, supra note 80, at 84-87.
96. Steel Seizure, 343 U.S. at 642-47.
97. See Mary L. Dudziak, A Sword and a Shield: The Uses of Law in the Bush
Administration, in THE PRESIDENCY OF GEORGE W. BUSH: A FIRST HISTORICAL
ASSESSMENT 39, 39-58 (Julian E. Zelizer ed., 2010).
98. See Jackson, supra note 9.
99. See id.; DUDZIAK, supra note 6, at 63-94.
100. See Jackson, supra note 9; see also supra notes 79-95 and accompanying
text.
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Jackson had once thought of 1946 as an ending to
warfare, but this new era had not brought peacetime.
Instead, he told the audience at Buffalo, “[t]he best that we
can now hope for seems to be a prolonged period of
international tension and rumors of war, with war itself as
the ever threatening alternative.”101 In this environment,
“we can no longer take either security or liberty for
granted.”102
He seemed to agree with the direction American
national security policy had taken, that protection from
global threats came not from international law but from
American power.103 “For security against foreign attack we
must look to the professions which manage our armed forces
and to the economy of the country that sustains them.”104
But Jackson remained hopeful about the status of the
United States in this new world order. “I see not the
slightest probability in the foreseeable future that any
conqueror can impose oppression upon us,” he told his
audience.105 Instead, “the dangers to our liberties which I
would discuss with you are those that we created among
ourselves.”106
Could he know whether his most important life‟s work,
his efforts at Nuremberg, were “but a flash of light in an
otherwise dark century, or . . . the harbinger of a dawn”?107
The world he had imagined at Nuremberg, in which peace
would follow war, had slipped away. The United Nations
had not become a powerful arena for global law
enforcement, but instead a site of Cold War politics.108 And
it was hard to imagine legal institutions restraining warfare
101. Jackson, supra note 9, at 104.
102. Id.
103. See HOGAN, supra note 17, at 24.
104. Jackson, supra note 9, at 104.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Jackson, supra note 1, at 293.
108. See generally STANLEY MEISLER, UNITED NATIONS: A HISTORY (rev. ed.
2011).
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when war and peace had melted together into an unsettling
and ambiguous era.
Americans were “troubled, disillusioned and confused,”
he said in late January, 1954, in the last year of his life. 109
American ideals seemed not to have taken hold in the
world, but were in retreat. And the nation had been drawn
into an arms race, “a policy of accumulating more military,
air and naval force than the Communists can muster.”110 Yet
he continued to believe that military force alone would not
determine the course of history, for the Cold War was
“largely a war of ideas, a struggle for the minds of men.”111
In terms of his own ideas, Jackson‟s Cold War era
jurisprudence will not warm the hearts of contemporary
civil libertarians. But in an era when war powers seem
immune to political restraints, Jackson‟s ideas about law
and power, the core lesson of Nuremberg, remains
important: the idea that the forces of war and destruction
can be constrained by a collective will embodied in law. This
was inscribed into his vision at Nuremberg. And when it
came to presidential war power, this remained for Jackson
an article of faith: “With all its defects, delays and
inconveniences,” he wrote in the Steel Seizure case, humans
“have discovered no technique for long preserving free
government except that the Executive be under the law, and
that the law be made by parliamentary deliberations.”112
And it was his role, and that of his colleagues on the bench,
to enforce this principle. “Such institutions may be destined
to pass away. But it is the duty of the Court to be last, not
first, to give them up.”113

109. Robert H. Jackson, Assoc. Justice of the Supreme Court of the U.S.,
Liberty Under Law, Address to the New York State Bar Association (Jan. 30,
1954), available at http://www.roberthjackson.org/the-man/speeches-articles/
speeches/speeches-by-robert-h-jackson/liberty-under-law/.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel Seizure), 343 U.S. 579,
655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
113. Id.

